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Introduction
The distribution of emission rights ranks high on the international agenda to reach agreements to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) and to mitigate climate change. Emission rights in the form of tradable permits are seen as a cost-effective instrument to achieve emission reduction targets for GHGs. However, the introduction of new property rights raises distributional concerns. Grandfathering schemes that allocate tradable permits proportional to emissions in a base year have been criticised for giving advantage to the largest polluters. In the course of the discussion a number of alternative suggestions have been brought forward, summarised by Rose (1992) , Barrett (1992) , Kverndokk (1995) and Rose et al. (1998) . Following Rose et al. (1998) it is useful to distinguish three different types of rules for equitable sharing: allocation based rules which apply to the initial distribution of emission permits, outcome based rules which apply to the distribution of the net benefits from emission reductions, and process based rules which comprise criteria for fair decision-making. This paper deals with outcome based sharing rules. But both, our focus and our approach, are different from previous studies of outcome based rules because we do not stipulate the existence of a binding international agreement. Rather we examine the possibility of selfenforcing agreements. In the absence of an enforcing supra-national body an international environmental agreement will have to be self-enforcing (Barrett 1994) . In this paper we study the impact of different rules to share the gains from cooperation on the stability of international climate agreements.
International environmental agreements have be described as games of coalition formation and have been studied by Hoel (1992) , Barrett (1994) , Na and Shin (1998) and others; see Bloch (2003) for a general survey of coalition formation games and Finus (2003) for a survey focusing on international environmental agreements. It is our prime interest in this paper to examine the stability of international climate coalitions under different surplus sharing rules.
This problem has not yet received any attention. The work that comes closest to this paper is by Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2004) who consider the impact of permit distribution on coalition stability, i.e. they consider allocation based rules. Bosello et al. (2003) have examined the impact of "outcome based equity criteria" on coalition stability, however, their equity concept is severely biased; they consider only equality on the abatement cost side and they disregard of the distribution of benefits from abatement completely.
To analyse stability of international climate agreements we employ a cartel formation game with open membership introduced by d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) . The game is a two-stage game. At stage one players decide whether or not to participate in an international agreement.
3
Those who decide to participate form a coalition. 1 We refer to those who do not participate as singletons. At stage two the coalition behaves like a single player; each singleton region and the coalition set emission reduction levels as an optimal response to others' emissions. For a singleton it is optimal to reduce emissions such that marginal abatement costs equal marginal benefits from a reduction of damages. Since emission reduction is a global public good, it is optimal for a coalition to reduce emissions such that the sum of the marginal benefits of all coalition members equal the marginal abatement costs. Payoffs are calculated from costs and benefits of abatement assuming the coalition employs a given sharing rule. The (subgame perfect) equilibria of the game coincide with the set of stable coalitions; see Finus et al. (2003) . A coalition is stable if no member has an incentive to leave the coalition (internal stability) and no singleton player has an incentive to join (external stability).
In our specification of the game (see section 4 for details) any coalition of two or more regions will always generate a surplus for its members as compared to the case where all regions are singletons; but it will also generate positive spillovers to non-members. Although there is a surplus, there will still be incentives to free-ride. An important factor determining the freerider incentives is the distribution of the surplus between coalition members, i.e. the sharing rule applied. We determine stable international climate coalitions for eight different sharing rules using a regionalised global model (12 regions) in which marginal costs of and marginal benefits from a reduction of GHGs are specified for each region. The model, called STACO, is designed to analyse the stability of coalitions. It has been introduced by Finus et al. (2003) and it has been used in subsequent work by Finus et al. (2004) and Altamirano-Cabrera et al.
(2004).
We find that, in general, coalitions consist of regions with low marginal abatement costs, which are attractive partners in any coalition, and regions which receive the largest share of the coalition surplus under a given sharing rule. While we do not claim that the empirical specification of the STACO model reflects the current knowledge on the impacts of climate change in all details, it reflects the main inter-regional differences of GHG abatement costs and damage costs of climate change. Therefore, our results may be instructive for the future design of climate policies.
The next section introduces a formal model of coalition formation. Stability of international climate coalitions depends on how the gains from cooperation are shared. We assume that sharing is based on claims and a rule how surplus shares are derived from claims. Section 3 discusses the selection of a surplus sharing rule. We go one step beyond the consideration of the ad hoc rules presented by Rose et al. (1998) 2 Coalition formation and coalition stability
We apply the cartel formation game introduced by d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) to the case of GHG abatement. The game proposed is a two-stage game where a coalition forms at the first stage; at the second stage abatement decisions are taken. To explain the structure of the game and its most important characteristics we first consider a simple transboundary pollution game without coalition formation (Mäler 1989, Folmer and von Mouche 2000) . Then, we introduce coalition formation. Further specifications of benefits and costs are provided in section 4. In the equilibrium each player adopts an abatement level q i which is an optimal response to others' emissions. It holds for each player that marginal benefits equal marginal abatement costs. Under a set of standard assumptions about production and damage cost functions and under a regularity assumption 2 such transboundary pollution game has a unique interior Nash equilibrium if pollution is uniformly distributed (Folmer and von Mouche 2000, Proposition 3) . As this condition applies to GHGs we will have a unique Nash equilibrium in a simple (no coalitions) GHG emissions game. Denote the Nash equilibrium abatement of player i * i q , then the Nash equilibrium payoffs are
This serves as a benchmark for the following.
2 The regularity assumption guarantees an interior solution. It requires that both, some small amount of emissions and some small amount of abatement, will be beneficial. For singleton players we obtain the payoffs:
For coalition members a sharing rule applies. A sharing rule assigns a share s i of the coalition surplus S K to every coalition member i K ∈ . The coalition surplus S K is defined as the joint gain of the coalition members compared with their payoff in the benchmark situation of a singletons coalition structure. Formally,
The payoff of a coalition member is given by her benchmark payoff plus her share of the coalition surplus.
An important special case to consider is the case of the grand coalition, K N = . The grand coalition will internalise all externalities of GHG emissions and adopt a Pareto efficient abatement strategy. The resulting abatement strategy profile 1 ( ,..., ) 
Sharing rules
Regions which join an international agreement will do so to secure a benefit from cooperation.
Whether there is a benefit for an individual region and how large this benefit will be is a matter of the sharing rule used to distribute the overall benefit within the coalition. Note that, 6 although there is a benefit from cooperation, a coalition might not be stable because the benefit from free-riding is even larger. Hence, a given coalition faces a surplus sharing problem and the rule according to which the surplus is shared is important for the decision of a region whether or not to join. Moulin (1987 ) and, particularly, Pfingsten (1991 we require that a sharing rule satisfies the following properties:
Surplus monotonicity:
Anonymity requires equal treatment of equals. Surplus monotonicity says that no one should loose if the surplus increases. Additivity says that payoffs should not change if the surplus is paid out in two instalments instead of one. Separability is a subgroup consistency requirement which says that individual payoffs in every subgroup depend only on the claims of the players in the subgroup and the subgroup's surplus. Anonymity and Surplus monotonicity are hardly debatable. We would argue that Additivity applies to the case at hand. As the true damages of climate change and, hence, the true benefits of abatement become known at a later stage, the distribution should not depend upon the pattern of how benefits become available. The case
for Separability is that it should not matter for the final outcome whether a player receives her share of the coalition surplus directly or whether payment is received by a subcoalition who then distributes the joint share of the surplus to its members. Pfingsten (1990) has shown that these properties characterise a family of sharing rules:
4 PROPOSITION 1 (Pfingsten): A sharing rule R satisfies Anonymity, Surplus monotonicity, Additivity and Separability if and only if R is either
As Anonymity, Surplus monotonicity, Additivity and Separability are defendable properties for the case of coalitions for GHG abatement, proposition 1 characterises the set of reasonable sharing rules.
In what follows we consider a set of 8 sharing problems which differ with respect to what constitutes a claim. One can apply different rules to these sharing problems (equal sharing, proportional sharing and combinations), our focus is, however, on proportional sharing.
Egalitarian claims:
i j λ = λ , for all i, j.
All players (regions) have equal claims. Egalitarian claims seem not to be convincing in the case of climate coalitions of heterogeneous regions. But still we include this case as a benchmark case because proportional sharing under egalitarian claims coincides with equal sharing.
Regional income claims:
where GDP i is region i's gross national product in a base year. This rule has also been dubbed "horizontal equity" by Rose et al. (1998) . One appealing feature of the rule is that it maintains relative welfare positions.
Population claims:
where pop i is region i's population in a base year. The motivation for this rule is straightforward: If individuals have equal rights to the global commons, gains from cooperation should be distributed evenly across the global population.
Ability-to-pay claims:
Regions with a lower per capita income have a larger claim. Under this rule climate policy is used a means to reduce inequality. So the motivation stems from outside climate policy. The distribution may be guided by some principle of "international justice".
Emissions claims:
i i e λ = , where e i are region i's emissions in a base year. Emissions claims can be interpreted as historical rights.
Inverse emissions claims:
Regions with a higher emissions share receive a lower share of the gains from cooperation.
These claims reflect historical responsibilities.
Damage cost claims:
where d i is the net present value of region i's damages from climate change. After implementation of abatement policies, some damages due to climate change will still remain.
Those who suffer larger damages, should receive a larger compensation.
Abatement cost claims:
where c i is the net present value of region i's abatement cost. The coalition surplus can be interpreted as a return to abatement investments. Who bears larger costs should be entitled to a larger share of the surplus.
Of course, a longer list of possible claims could be generated. Next to egalitarian claims which serve as a benchmark we include income, population and ability-to-pay claims because they have received extensive discussion by Rose et al. (1998) . Emissions claims are probably the most prominent and are the outcome based analogue to a grandfathering scheme of emission permits. Inverse emission claims, which reflect historical responsibilities, are less prominent in economic analysis, but they have received some discussion in philosophy (Gosseries 2004 , Weikard 2004 . We have included damage cost and abatement cost claims because they reflect different views on compensation. Marginal damage cost claims seem worth considering as they have been discussed in the literature (cf. Chander and Tulkens 1995) . However, our empirical results are derived using a linear damage cost function. In this case, the use of marginal damage cost claims will lead to the same result as the use of damage cost claims. Marginal abatement cost claims have not been included because the optimal abatement strategy for the coalition requires equal marginal abatement cost for all coalition members; hence, such claims will lead to equal sharing.
4 Empirical model and data
In order to examine the sharing problems described in the previous section we adopt a 12-regions model, called STACO, introduced by Finus et al. (2003) . STACO considers a baseline scenario of growing emissions over a 100 years time horizon. A discount rate of 2% is used for intertemporal aggregation to calculate the net present values of costs and benefits of abatement.
STACO uses a specification of regional abatement cost functions from Ellerman and Decaux (1998) . Marginal abatement costs are specified as ( ) STACO considers constant abatement paths; abatement costs are assumed to be constant over time. Table 1 gives discounted marginal abatement costs for a uniform abatement level across regions (column 2). Furthermore, Table 1 reports emissions reductions for the Nash equilibrium of the singletons coalition structure (column 3), and the corresponding marginal and total abatement costs (columns 4 and 5). Emissions reductions and marginal and total abatement costs are also reported for the grand coalition (columns 6-8). It can be seen from column 2 that, for a uniform abatement level, CHN has the lowest marginal abatement costs followed by USA and FSU while BRA has by far the highest. CHN, USA and FSU have high emissions levels (see Table 2 , column 5) and cheap abatement options, while BRA's abatement options are expensive due to low emissions levels. For the singletons coalition structure the picture changes. EET and BRA have the lowest marginal abatement cost while EEC and USA have the highest. In this case each region equates marginal abatement costs with marginal damage costs which causes USA and EEC to adopt high levels of abatement while BRA chooses to abate very little. Under a grand coalition 37 % of the global abatement will take place in CHN since CHN provides the cheapest abatement options. One can presume that CHN is an attractive partner in any stable climate coalition that might emerge.
The STACO model uses a linear approximation of the damage cost function of the DICE model introduced by Nordhaus (1997) . Moreover, the damage cost function is rescaled using estimates of Tol (1997) . Global benefits from abatement are defined as avoided damages.
Regional benefits are calculated as shares of global benefits from abatement based on estimates from Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1997) ; see Finus et al. (2003) . The shares are reported in Table 2 , column 7. Because STACO uses a linear benefits function marginal benefits are constant and are reported in Table 1 , column 4 (recall that for each region marginal benefits equal marginal abatement costs for the singletons coalition structure). No coalition or singleton will adjust its strategy if others change theirs, because there is no change in marginal damage cost. Proposition 2 states an important feature of the STACO specification. That regions have a dominant strategy in the global pollution game implies that there is no "leakage". Members of a non-trivial coalition will abate more compared with the singletons coalition structure. This additional abatement is not offset by less abatement of the remaining singletons, as they have dominant strategies. Note that this feature does not generally apply in a broader class of transboundary pollution games.
The information on benefits and costs of abatement described above is sufficient to determine the payoffs for every singleton or coalition in the global pollution game. To determine the payoffs and equilibria of the coalition formation game we need information on the sharing of coalition surplus. Surplus is shared proportional to claims. Finus et al. (2003) .
Results and discussion
The STACO model is used to generate the payoffs for every possible coalition structure (2 12 -12 = 4084 in a 12 regions model) for the sharing schemes described above. STACO performs a stability check and identifies the internally stable coalitions (where no member would want to leave) and the externally stable coalitions (where no singleton would want to join). The findings for the 8 sharing schemes and the benchmark cases (singletons coalition structure and the grand coalition) are summarised in Table 3 . 5 The stable coalitions for each scheme are listed in column 2. Column 3 reports the global annual emission reduction and columns 4-6 report costs, benefits and the resulting net benefits from abatement. Note that a considerable amount of benefits is obtained under the singletons coalition structure. The additional net benefits due to coalition formation are reported in column 7 as the sum of coalition surplus and external benefits; in column 8 this is expressed as a percentage.
There are several findings. It can be seen from 
We observe that the use of egalitarian claims, population claims, ability-to-pay claims and inverse emission claims is not very successful in terms of emission reduction and in terms of net benefits as compared to the singletons case. Abatement cost claims give a mixed picture.
Sharing according to regional income and damages is more successful. The best results are obtained when claims are according to emissions. The stable coalition found for that case comprises of USA, EET, EEX and CHN and achieves about 35% of the gains that the grand coalition would achieve.
Another observation is that CHN always joins the coalition except for the "extreme" case of inverse emissions. The explanation here is straightforward. Due to low marginal abatement cost CHN is an attractive partner in a coalition. But it depends on the sharing rule who will sign an agreement with CHN. For example, with an equal sharing rule USA or EEC are not involved. On equal sharing CHN would receive a too large share of the surplus and it is better for USA or EEC to take a free-rider position. A similar situation arises with sharing according to population or ability-to-pay. The situation is different with income claims and damages claims. In these cases USA or EEC can reap more of the benefits, sufficiently much to make the free-rider position unattractive.
In the "extreme case" of inverse emissions there are coalitions with BRA. The intuitive explanation is as follows. With inverse emission claims BRA has by far the largest claim. This makes it attractive for BRA to join any existing coalition which makes them externally unstable. Coalitions with BRA, however, are unattractive for other coalition partners, which makes them internally unstable, unless the coalition is of size 2 (see Proposition 3). Also note that BRA has little options for CO 2 emission abatement and, hence, high abatement costs.
Coalitions with BRA achieve very little as compared to the singletons benchmark case.
More generally, the following pattern emerges. As CHN has by far the lowest abatement costs, it has an incentive to join (almost) any two-player coalition. CHN's low cost abatement options generate a high coalition surplus of which it receives a sufficient share under almost every reasonable rule. Therefore, (almost) every two-player coalition not involving CHN will be externally unstable. Hence, if a two-player coalition is stable it is likely to involve CHN.
From proposition 3 we know that every two-player coalition is internally stable. However, it is, in general, attractive for others to join a coalition including CHN, in particular for regions with large claims. Thus, where we find stable two-player coalitions they will consist of CHN and the region with the largest claim. This pattern applies in a straightforward manner to income claims ({EEC, CHN}), population claims ({EEX, CHN}), inverse emission claims ({CHN, BRA}), and damage cost claims ({USA, CHN} and {EEC, CHN}). This simple 14 pattern does not apply to abatement cost claims as abatement costs are coalition dependent. In this case, seven (out of eleven) two-player coalitions with CHN are stable.
In the remaining cases of equal sharing, ability-to-pay claims and emissions claims we find coalitions of size three or more. The subsequent analysis seeks to identify the factors which are relevant for the composition of stable coalitions. Can we identify regions that are more likely to join a coalition than others? In general, in our setting, regions are described by three parameters: marginal abatement cost, marginal benefits, and the claims to a coalition surplus.
For the decision whether or not to join a coalition a region compares its share of the surplus when joining a coalition with its free-rider surplus. First, consider the impact of marginal abatement costs. Regions which have low marginal abatement costs contribute more to the size of the coalition surplus. Hence, with other things equal, we would expect to find the regions with the lowest marginal abatement costs in a coalition. Second, the impact of marginal benefits is ambiguous. On the one hand, high marginal benefits stimulate coalition partners to abate more which contributes to a higher coalition surplus. On the other hand high marginal benefits are an incentive to free-ride. One can define a free-rider surplus as the product of marginal benefits from abatement and the additional abatement of the coalition (compared to the singletons coalition structure). 6 We presume that high marginal benefits cause stronger incentives to free-ride than incentives to join the coalition. This is because the additional surplus of joining will have to be shared with other coalition members. Other things being equal a region is more likely to be in coalition if its marginal benefits are low. Third, with unequal claims, a region is more likely to join a coalition if its claims are high.
We use this argument to construct a rough indicator for the relative advantage from coalition membership. We use the following ingredients: (i) marginal abatement cost at 50 Mton per year (Table 1 , column 3), c′ , (ii) marginal benefits (Table 1 , column 5), b′ , and (iii) the share of total claims (Table 2) . Rescaling the cost and benefits parameters, we propose the following coalition membership index I:
The first factor captures surplus size; the second captures free-rider incentives; the third captures 'the size of a region's share in a coalition. A region is more likely to be a coalition member if it has a high coalition membership index, that is if its marginal abatement costs are low, if its marginal benefits are low, and if its share of the surplus is high. Of course, such indicator cannot work "precisely" as marginal abatement cost and the share of the surplus a 15 region receives will be coalition dependent. A general coalition membership index cannot be constructed as this requires to attach weights to each component of the index which will differ between claim types. However, based on parameters í c′ , i b′ and í λ we can obtain a partial The index we suggest is reported in Table 4 . For equal sharing the highest coalition membership indices are reported for CHN, EET and IND. These regions form the only externally stable coalition of the about 100 internally stable coalitions for the case of equal sharing. This confirms our expectation. In the case of income claims EEC has a higher index than CHN. In this case the index identifies only USA correctly as a coalition member. For the cases of population claims, ability-to-pay claims, inverse emission claims and damage cost claims the index performs well, identifying correctly members of stable coalitions. For emission claims three of the four coalition members are correctly identified. The most successful coalition we find is when claims are according to emissions. As can be seen from Table 5 the success of the coalition for the global surplus depends largely on the presence of both, USA and CHN, in the coalition. Three players coalitions {EET, EEX, CHN} and {USA, EET, EEX} are less successful than {USA, CHN}, which achieves a global surplus of 996 bln US$ over 100 years (not reported in the table). In the case of emissions claims CHN has strong incentives to join as it has high claims (and obtains a large share of the surplus when joining) and it has low abatement costs. In fact, no coalition that does not include CHN is externally stable. USA joins CHN because under emission claims USA receives the largest share. EEC has the third largest claim, but they have a strong free-rider incentive. USA and CHN are joined by EET and EEX who receive lower shares than EEC but 16 have less incentive to free-ride. The simple intuitive explanation why emission based claims are more successful than any alternative rule considered here is as follows. A high level of emissions is linked to better opportunities for abatement and, hence, low abatement costs.
Coalitions that include regions with lower abatement costs create a larger surplus. Under emissions claims these regions are encouraged to join a coalition. 
Conclusion
Greenhouse gas abatement is a global public good. It is hardly surprising that the implementation of the Kyoto protocol is hampered by adverse incentives of potential coalition partners although a large coalition could create large scale global benefits. Due to the public goods character of abatement the very success of a coalition undermines its viability. The more abatement a coalition achieves the stronger grow the incentives to free-ride. This paper explores the role of surplus sharing for coalition stability. We have identified the stable coalitions for a set of different modes of surplus sharing; in particular we examine equal sharing and sharing proportional to claims. The results show that some of the sharing schemes, for example when claims reflect historical responsibilities (inverse emissions), generate only small and ineffective coalitions ({EET, BRA} and {CHN, BRA}). These achieve only 0.5% and 2.4% of the potential surplus of globally optimal carbon abatement, respectively. In the given set of rules proportional sharing with emission claims performs best.
The coalition {USA, EET, EEX, CHN} achieves about 35% of the potential surplus.
Emissions claims set the right incentives to get the large emitters with low abatement costs "into the boat". This paper studies the performance of a set of given sharing rules that have been proposed in the debate on climate change policies. The task for subsequent research is to use these insights for the design of sharing rules which will stabilise larger and more successful coalitions. For the success of a coalition it is important to get the regions with low abatement costs to join.
But these will do little unless regions with high marginal damage costs are also joining. Only this would lead to a large scale internalisation of the externalities from carbon emissions. 
